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A B S T R A C T
Crypto ransomware is a type of malware that locks access to user ﬁles by encrypting them and demands a ransom
in order to obtain the decryption key. This type of malware has become a serious threat for most enterprises. In
those cases where the infected computer has access to documents in network shared volumes, a single host can
lock access to documents across several departments in the company. We propose an algorithm that can detect
ransomware action and prevent further activity over shared documents. The algorithm is based on the analysis
of passively monitored traﬃc by a network probe. 19 diﬀerent ransomware families were used for testing the
algorithm in action. The results show that it can detect ransomware activity in less than 20 s, before more than
10 ﬁles are lost. Recovery of even those ﬁles was also possible because their content was stored in the traﬃc
monitored by the network probe. Several days of traﬃc from real corporate networks were used to validate a
low rate of false alarms. This paper oﬀers also analytical models for the probability of early detection and the
probability of false alarms for an arbitrarily large population of users.
1. Introduction
Ransomware is a type of malware that extorts computer users by
locking access to their computers (lockscreen ransomware) or lock-
ing access to their ﬁles by encrypting them (encryption ransomware,
crypto ransomware or cryptoware). During 2016, Europol declared
that encrypting ransomware had become “the most prominent malware
threat […] for citizens and enterprises alike” (EUROPOL, 2016).
Cryptoware is now recognised as the most proﬁtable malware type
in history (Cisco Systems, 2016) and hundreds of millions of dollars are
estimated to be extorted to users every year (Symantec Corporation,
2016). A survey conducted in 2016 with 290 organizations from dif-
ferent industries in the United States, Canada, Germany and the United
Kingdom found that nearly 50% of them had been victims of a ran-
somware attack during the previous 12 months (Osterman Research
and Inc., 2016). Around 40% of the targets declared having paid the
ransom. However, even if the organization pays the ransom, there is no
guarantee that it will recover the ﬁles.
Not only local ﬁles to the infected computer are encrypted. Most
organizations employ volume sharing protocols with networked disk
arrays in order to make documents easily accessible to the users. All
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the documents could be in shared volumes, helping the backup proce-
dures and allowing for user proﬁle mobility and team work. However,
this also makes them more vulnerable as the shared volumes are usu-
ally reachable from any infected computer in the organization. Recent
ransomware incarnations include a worm behaviour that tries to spread
the infection as much as possible through the local network, to comput-
ers reachable through Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) or to random
targets in the public Internet (Selvaraj et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2017).
Therefore, upon infection discovery the organization must usually stop
business until its systems are cleaned and backup images are restored
(Mathieu Rosemain and Le Guernigou).
In a volume sharing scenario a single infected host could encrypt a
whole networked volume (Sjouwerman, 2017), with a global impact
on the organization business. The ﬁles must be recovered from the
most recent backup. Nightly backups are a common policy (Osterman
Research and Inc., 2016) and the main recovery mechanism from a ran-
somware attack. They are easier to implement in scenarios with central-
ized volumes shared through a network. Upon suﬀering a ransomware
infection, as much work time is lost as it took to detect the intrusion,
because all the documents modiﬁed from the previous backup are only
in the encrypted volumes. Including the IT (Information Technologies)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2018.09.013
Received 21 February 2018; Received in revised form 21 June 2018; Accepted 21 September 2018
Available online 24 September 2018
1084-8045/© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
D. Morato et al. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 124 (2018) 14–32
personnel work-time for the recovery from the backups, at least 8 h
of work per employee are usually lost (Osterman Research and Inc.,
2016), and more time could be spent in order to put all the business
back on track. If the event reaches the media, the organization must
also account for the damage to its public image. Finally, ﬁnancial and
healthcare services are the most frequent and lucrative targets. When
the latter are targeted (Cisco Systems, 2016; Lee et al., 2017), losses of
lives due to delays in treatments or incorrect medications being admin-
istered could result.
Long delays in upgrading or applying critical software patches in
these organizations oﬀer great opportunities for attackers. This was the
case in the “SamSam” ransomware campaign that aﬀected JBoss servers
in the Healthcare industry (Cisco Systems, 2016), as in the recent (May
2017) and extensive “WannaCry” infection (Selvaraj et al., 2017; Lee
et al., 2017). These delays are due to the operational costs incurred by
each update, as any change must be validated against all the software
used in the organization, and deployment of the patch must be planned,
usually disrupting work.
In this paper we present REDFISH (Ransomware Early Detection
from FIle SHaring traﬃc), a framework for the detection and blockage
of ransomware action when it tries to encrypt ﬁles contained in shared
network volumes from a NAS (Network Attached Storage). This is a very
frequent but unsolved scenario for present malware detection tools. We
focus on network volumes shared using Server Message Block (SMB)
protocol as it is the most common scenario in an oﬃce environment,
however, the procedure could be exported to other volume sharing pro-
tocols. Our approach does not require the installation of software on
any end-host, contrary to the common procedure in an anti-malware
software deployment (Continella et al., 2016; Kharraz and Kirda, 2017;
Scaife et al., 2016). We show that a network traﬃc inspection device
can analyse traﬃc to the shared volumes and detect ransomware activ-
ity using behavioural patterns. This device and its updates are easier to
deploy than updating the whole set of computers in an organization. It
monitors every access to the shared volumes and it can program rules in
an SDN environment for blocking traﬃc to the protected volumes from
any computer that it detects to be infected. A network traﬃc inspection
device can work outside the traﬃc path, analysing a copy of the packet
traﬃc, received through a switch port mirror (see Fig. 1). Therefore, it
does not introduce any extra delay to the user actions and as it is not
installed on the user computer it is not vulnerable to being uninstalled
by any malware.
We ran our experiments using more than 50 samples from 19 dif-
ferent ransomware families. All the samples were successfully detected.
The results show detection times below 20 s. In more than a 99% per-
cent of the detections, at most 10 ﬁles were encrypted before the alarm
was raised and access from that computer to the volume could be
blocked.
The main contributions of this paper are:
Fig. 1. Networking scenario. The traﬃc between the hosts and the NAS is repli-
cated from a switch into the traﬃc analysis probe.
• Present a ransomware detection algorithm based on the analysis of
network traﬃc to shared volumes. Shared volumes is the most com-
mon deployment in a corporate environment but no previous pro-
posal has targeted this speciﬁc scenario.
• Validate the detection algorithm with 19 diﬀerent families of ran-
somware and traﬃc from corporate networks with thousands of
users. We avoid false positives (raising an alarm when no ran-
somware is present) by tuning the algorithm parameters to the typ-
ical behaviour of users and computer programs.
• Provide and validate analytical model approximations for the algo-
rithm success and failure rate.
• Describe a network traﬃc analysis tool deployment capable of
detecting ransomware infection without any software installation at
the end-hosts and adding no delay to user actions. The architecture
allows also easy deployment of ﬁle recovery tools that from nightly
backups and network traﬃc can reconstruct ﬁle status before its
encryption and destruction.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2
describes the previous works in the literature on ransomware detec-
tion; section 3 describes the scenario of network shared volumes and
the traﬃc traces used in the analysis. Section 4 describes the algorithm,
selects the best conﬁguration for fast and eﬀective ransomware detec-
tion and presents analytical models for its analysis. Section 5 compares
the results using traﬃc traces from diﬀerent user scenarios; section 6
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed solution
and section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Related work
Modern crypto-ransomware infections started in 2013 with Cryp-
toLocker using public-private key cryptography (Ahmadian et al.,
2015). It became a global problem in 2016, when more than 1,400,000
Kaspersky users were attacked, most of them by “Locky” and “CTB-
Locker”. About 22.6% of those users were in the corporate sector
(Kaspersky Security Bulletin, 2017). In 2017, “WannaCry” ransomware
infected in one day 400,000 machines in more than 150 countries,
including the United States and China (Crowe). The adaptation of
malware (Scaife et al., 2016) in order to avoid detection has made
signature-based detection techniques obsolete (Vidal et al., 2017). They
require frequent updates of the malware ﬁngerprints database, and
they are incapable of dealing with zero-day infections (Nieuwenhuizen,
2016). The research on ad-hoc ransomware detection procedures has
oﬀered in that period several alternatives with better or worse success
rates.
Detection techniques capable of coping with 0-day ransomware
attacks try to recognise the malware based on more general charac-
teristics than basic software signatures. Some detection frameworks
search for encryption primitives in malware code in order to block it
or at least warn the user (Kolodenker et al., 2017). In Continella et
al. (2016) the authors try to ﬁnd the expanded AES encryption key
in the process memory. This procedure is valid only for ransomware
using this symmetric block cipher, although the authors comment that
it could be extended to other ciphers. Solutions like the one presented
in Kolodenker et al. (2017) try to store all the possible encryption keys
being used by any program, therefore, if one of the programs was a ran-
somware the ﬁles could be restored. They require the dynamic inspec-
tion of cryptographic calls used by the process. All these alternatives
could produce false positive detections for normal encryption software,
they take CPU time from the user host and they could fail when the
ransomware uses diﬀerent encryption libraries and algorithms.
The use of decoy ﬁles or canary ﬁles is a completely diﬀerent alter-
native (CryptoStopper, 2017; Feng and Liu, 2017). In those scenarios
the anti-ransomware software monitors the modiﬁcation of ﬁles cre-
ated across the volume. Those ﬁles are not user-created documents,
therefore no modiﬁcations are expected, however, the ransomware will
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probably try to encrypt those ﬁles. When the ransomware deletes one
of those canary ﬁles, it is detected by the anti-malware tool. This pro-
cedure requires monitoring a large amount of ﬁles if it wants to detect
the malware before many user ﬁles are lost, as it cannot guarantee that
the ransomware will attack the canary ﬁles ﬁrst. It is also vulnerable
to ransomware samples that avoid those ﬁles; they could, for example,
encrypt ﬁrst the most recently used ﬁles or those from the recent ﬁles
list in some common applications.
The proposal of using canary ﬁles is a precursor and simpler version
of the detection frameworks based on monitoring any disk access by
user programs. Ransomware activity can be detected based on statis-
tics like the amount of read, written and/or deleted ﬁles, the access to
many diﬀerent ﬁle types, the search through a large quantity of direc-
tories and the creation of ﬁles with a much larger entropy than the
original ﬁle, which is an indicator of possible data encryption. Recent
proposals using this approach are (Kharraz and Kirda, 2017; Scaife et
al., 2016; Kharraz et al., 2016; Shukla et al., 2016). All these papers are
based on Microsoft Windows drivers that intercept I/O (Input/Output)
system calls and analyse patterns, using simple linear combinations of
measured indicators (Kharraz and Kirda, 2017) or using machine learn-
ing techniques (Defeat Ransomware). These algorithms produce good
detection results, for example the one presented in Kharraz and Kirda
(2017) has 100% ransomware detection rate with 0.8% of false posi-
tives (cases where it triggers an alarm when only benign applications
were running). However, they take a toll on host performance, with
CPU usage in the range of 2.8%–9% depending on the implementation.
They produce false positive detection when the user takes actions sim-
ilar to what a ransomware would do, creating ﬁles with high entropy
(e.g. compressed ﬁles) and deleting ﬁles. They are also vulnerable to
malware that escalates privileges and uninstalls detection tools (Con-
tinella et al., 2016).
Solutions based on network traﬃc analysis can be deployed on the
end-host but also on ﬁrewalls or network traﬃc analysis probes. When
installed out of the hosts they are solutions less vulnerable to being
removed by the ransomware and they do not consume user computer
resources. The traﬃc they use to detect the ransomware action is the
communication that it requires with its command and control (C&C)
servers in order to obtain the key for ﬁle encryption. This detection
procedure fails in case of encryption with a local key without con-
tact to any server; however, those strains of ransomware are infre-
quent nowadays as they contain the decryption key, which could be
extracted by a skilled software analyst. Some ransomware strains try
to hide their network traﬃc by accessing compromised web servers
as a proxy to reach their C&C servers. They can be blocked using a
list of addresses, which must be frequently updated (Cabaj and Mazur-
czyk, 2016; Umbrella, 2016). Some ransomware strains try to contact
servers using DNS names generated by a DGA (Domain Generation
Algorithm) which makes black-listing useless. In Ahmadian et al. (2015)
the authors present heuristics for detecting these randomly generated
names, however they must adapt their algorithm to many languages in
order to detect randomly generated domain names without false posi-
tive alarms; moreover, they are vulnerable to generated domain names
that are not random but dictionary based.
Commercial anti-virus solutions like (Defeat Ransomware;
Umbrella, 2016) try to characterize network traﬃc using machine
learning techniques in order to rise alarms in case of abnormal
behaviour. They are prone to false positive detection and therefore
they are not typically conﬁgured for automatic application blockage
and require user validation (Defeat Ransomware), which increases the
window of opportunity for ransomware action.
Finally, proposals like (Continella et al., 2016; Kharraz and Kirda,
2017; Shukla et al., 2016; Sophos Intercept X, 2017) intercept ﬁle
access system calls and oﬀer the added functionality of storing the
original version of the ﬁles as well as any user modiﬁcations. They pro-
vide the capability of restoring the original ﬁle in case of encryption.
However, they are vulnerable to uninstallation by ransomware getting
administrator privileges, and they take CPU and hard disk resources.
The above-mentioned methods try to detect a ransomware when
it is encrypting ﬁles in the user’s computer. However, in most
enterprise productivity deployments user documents are located in
central network shared volumes (Eurostat Statistics Explained). They
can be documents shared by groups of users or even the whole set
of documents from a user for allowing mobility among hosts. The
centralization oﬀers better storage utilization with higher quality disks,
group sharing capabilities, easier maintenance and simpler periodic
backups. In fact, most enterprises hit by ransomware recover their
documents thanks to nightly backups (Osterman Research and Inc.,
2016). However, the same centralization and sharing opens the door to
a single infected computer encrypting lots of documents with eﬀects on
many company departments. Locally installed malware detectors could
prevent ransomware from encrypting network shared volumes, how-
ever, they require installation and updates on the whole set of company
computers. As far as we know, no previous work has tried to detect ran-
somware action based on the traﬃc to a NAS system. In this paper we
show how a single network probe can detect and stop any ransomware
by the analysis of traﬃc to a network ﬁle server. Tens of gigabits
per second of sustained traﬃc are supported, adding ﬁle recovery
capabilities in order to reduce ransomware impact to a minimum.
3. Network scenario
In a LAN (Local Area Network), NAS volumes are usually enterprise-
class disks shared using one or more network protocols over the Internet
Protocol (IP). The applications are installed in the local hosts and only
the documents are stored in network volumes. We center our case on
volumes that store exclusively shared user documents, which can be
modiﬁed frequently or rarely, but always by user actions. They could
be spreadsheets, text documents, images, presentations, etc. We assume
that guarded volumes do not contain application conﬁguration ﬁles,
user proﬁles, mailboxes, etc. Those are directories that suﬀer frequent
ﬁle deletions due to normal application behaviour, but they are not
critical.
The algorithm presented in this paper is based on analysing the IP
traﬃc to the NAS appliance. We can get access to this traﬃc through
several monitoring techniques. The algorithm could be implemented
in an on-path ﬁrewall; however, it would incur in some processing
delay (Lin and Lee, 2013). In order to avoid any delay to user traﬃc
we propose an oﬀ-path deployment. In an enterprise network, Ethernet
switches oﬀer the capability of port mirroring, i.e. duplicating traﬃc
from a network port to another port (SPAN or mirror port) where an
analysis probe running REDFISH would be connected. This is the sce-
nario depicted in Fig. 1. It is an oﬀ-path deployment where no extra
delay is added to the traﬃc by its analysis (traﬃc mirroring is imple-
mented in hardware switches at line rate).
Finally, being oﬀ-path, the probe cannot block traﬃc from an
infected host as a ﬁrewall could, however, it can program discarding
rules in an SDN-enabled switch, obtaining the same result.
3.1. Network storage traﬃc
In a NAS environment, volume access is provided at the ﬁle level,
being the server called a ﬁler. The protocols used are nowadays almost
exclusively transported over TCP/IP and the most frequent are NFS
(Network File System), SMB (Server Message Block) and AFP (Apple
Filing Protocol). NFS is mostly deployed in the UNIX environment while
AFP is restricted to macOS computers. SMB, in its several versions
(SMB/CIFS, SMB2, SMB3), is the most common protocol for ﬁle shar-
ing in the Microsoft Windows environment. The popularity of Microsoft
Windows desktops makes ransomware more common for this operating
system, even though there are strains for GNU/Linux or even Android
(Liviu Arsene, 2016; Emm et al., 2016). In this paper we focus on net-
work traﬃc to shared volumes using the SMB protocol. This is the
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default sharing protocol for all versions of Microsoft Windows, which
is the de-facto desktop operating system in most companies. However,
the proposed algorithm for ransomware detection does not require any
feature speciﬁc to SMB protocol and it could be easily extended to other
network ﬁle access protocols and versions.
In a NAS environment, SMB is transported over a TCP connection
between the user’s PC and the ﬁler, using port 445 at the latter (IANA).
It is a binary protocol with at least 75 diﬀerent commands in its ver-
sion 1 and 19 in its version 2. The most frequent protocol behaviour
is a request-response one, although asynchronous notiﬁcations do exist
(Microsoft Corporation).
We analysed host behaviour on opening, reading, writing and delet-
ing shared ﬁles. The proposed algorithm is based on the diﬀerences
between the traﬃc from an infected and a not infected host. Some
locally installed ransomware detection proposals (Continella et al.,
2016; Kharraz and Kirda, 2017; Sgandurra et al.,; Kharraz et al., 2015)
intercept disk access API (Application Programming Interface) calls and
can distinguish which program is responsible for each ﬁle access. The
SMB protocol traﬃc does not oﬀer an identiﬁcation of the application
that originated a ﬁle request, therefore we can only distinguish between
accesses from diﬀerent hosts.
Each host client maintains a TCP connection with the server. In
case of disk array controllers that oﬀer virtual volumes using diﬀerent
IP addresses, a single host could maintain several TCP connections,
one for each server IP address. The algorithm proposed in this paper is
based on the analysis of SMB/SMB2 traﬃc in a single TCP connection.
When a single host maintains several connections or there is more
than one client or server, the analysis is done in parallel for each TCP
connection. In fact, we present results from the analysis of traﬃc traces
with thousands of concurrent SMB sessions. The scalability results
presented in section 6 show that a single CPU core on an analysis probe
can process 10Gb/s of this traﬃc. This is the scenario of an enterprise
class dedicated ﬁle server for a large company.
{Th}e analysis of SMB traﬃc in the probe extracts the protocol com-
mands. On the following we describe the SMB2 commands (Microsoft
Corporation) that will oﬀer most information to the ransomware
detection algorithm. SMB2 is used from Microsoft Windows Vista to
Windows 10.
• SMB2 CREATE [Request or Response]: The request command is sent
by the client in order to create a ﬁle or get access to it. The response
message contains the ﬁle size, which will be useful in order to detect
write commands that overwrite existing data.
• SMB2 READ [Request or Response]: The request command is sent
by the client in order to initiate a read operation on an opened ﬁle.
It contains the amount of bytes to read and the ﬁle oﬀset where the
operation should begin. The response message contains the bytes
read.
• SMB2 WRITE [Request or Response]: The request command is sent
by the client in order to initiate a write operation on an opened ﬁle.
It contains the bytes to write and the ﬁle oﬀset where the operation
should take place. The response message contains the amount of
bytes written.
• SMB2 SET INFO [Request or Response]: Among other options, the
request command can be used to mark a ﬁle for deletion. The ﬁle
will be deleted when all handles to the ﬁle are closed (Microsoft
Corporation).
• SMB2 CLOSE [Request or Response]: The request command is used
by the client to close an instance of a ﬁle that was opened with a
CREATE Request.
Our prototype implementation supports also SMB/CIFS (SMB ver-
sion 1). SMB1 is commonly used in Microsoft Windows XP systems.
The commands have a similar purpose but for brevity we omit their
description.
3.2. User behaviour, ransomware behaviour and infected datasets
We have used two types of traﬃc traces:
• SMB traﬃc from enterprise oﬃces where no ransomware was in
action. We used these traces in order to tune the algorithm for a low
false positive behaviour. This means not triggering the alarm when
no ransomware is active. We also used these traces to estimate the
probability of false alarms triggered by the algorithm.
• SMB traﬃc from cases of ransomware encrypting ﬁles in network
shared volumes. We used these traces in order to measure how early
the algorithm could detect diﬀerent strains of ransomware and the
amount of ﬁles that should be recovered from backups.
In the following subsections we describe the scenario where each
traﬃc trace was obtained and their macroscopic characteristics.
3.2.1. Traﬃc traces for not infected scenarios
We have been capturing traﬃc from the Public University of
Navarre Internet access link since 2006. We have extended this capture
to links from a NAS ﬁler, used internally by most of the non-academic
staﬀ. This is a scenario with thousands of oﬃce users, hundreds of
which access simultaneously the volumes shared from a NAS. All non-
SMB traﬃc has been removed from the traces. We have used an 8h
long traﬃc capture for the algorithm parameter tuning phase. We call
this trace the Campus0 trace in Table 1. Afterwards, we have validated
the results using 6 traces, each one 24 h long, from the same scenario
(from Campus1 to Campus6 traﬃc traces). We have extended the vali-
dation using a traﬃc trace captured in an oﬃce environment in a large
company (Private). We present all the validation results in section 5.
Table 1
Traﬃc traces from not infected scenarios.
Campus0 Campus1 Campus2 Campus3 Campus4 Campus5 Campus6 Private
Place University University University University University University University Large company
Date 2017-01-16 2017-02-22 2017-02-23 2017-02-24 2017-02-27 2017-02-28 2017-03-01 2015-04-24
Duration 8h40min 24 h 24 h 24 h 24 h 24 h 24 h 24 h
Size (Gbytes) 212 469 352 333 383 355 714 1100
Total SMB connections 46609 45414 43716 34864 42593 42162 43543 2717091
Stats for connections longer than 5 min that do READ and WRITE SMB operations
SMB connections 401 424 391 375 362 369 386 21764
Client hosts 330 327 320 306 302 306 313 4882
Server hosts 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1677
Avg. Connection duration (hours) 5.93 5.43 5.70 5.60 5.97 5.86 5.86 3.5
Files opened per connection 7640 9437 8589 6115 12224 7717 7870 1863
Mbytes read per connection 91.4 68.6 75.6 65.3 94.9 69.8 82.5 18.4
Mbytes written per connection 294.19 295.6 288.97 237.9 315.1 307.5 306.1 5.2
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We show some basic statistics for these traces in Table 1. We have
removed any connection that does not contain READ and WRITE SMB
commands, as there is no ﬁle manipulation in them.
3.2.2. Traﬃc traces for infection scenarios
We have obtained ransomware samples from Hybrid Analysis and
Malware Traﬃc Analysis. They were uploaded by diﬀerent users and
tagged as ransomware by antivirus tools. Table 2 lists the samples
grouped by families. The naming of the samples comes from the same
source as the binary ﬁles and it cannot be considered entirely reli-
able, as documented in previous papers (Canto et al., 2008). However,
every sample used has been checked for ransomware activity encrypt-
ing ﬁles.
For running the samples we created a virtualized Windows 7 deploy-
ment using a host with an Intel Core 2 Duo CPU E6750 running at
2.66GHz. We ran a VM (Virtual Machine) acting as the infected user
(client) and a second VM acting as the SMB ﬁler (server). The traf-
ﬁc between the VMs is captured in a pcap ﬁle while the ransomware
is running. This emulates the traﬃc capture done by the analysis
probe.
We have created a random ﬁle population in the ﬁler. We recover
from a snapshot the VM and the volume containing the documents for
every new test. For the oldest ransomware samples we used a ﬁle popu-
lation of 1916 ﬁles with an aggregated size of 1.88GB and a maximum
ﬁle size of 25.6MB. For the most recent samples (since March 2017)
we have used a larger ﬁle population whose sizes are obtained from
a lognormal distribution with a Pareto tail. This model for ﬁle sizes
and directory structure is described in Agrawal et al. (2009) and it was
obtained from a dataset of over 60,000 Windows computer ﬁle system
images in a large corporation. We used the default parameters recom-
mended in that paper. The directory structure is also random, imitating
a real ﬁle-system. The resulting new dataset contains 5138 ﬁles with
an aggregated size of 5.3GB, ﬁles of a maximum of 838MB and a tree
depth of 8 directories.
Table 2 shows a summary of the more than 50 ransomware sam-
ples obtained, clustered in 19 families. Each sample represents a dif-
ferent binary ﬁle, run for encryption of the ﬁles in our random pop-
ulation. Previous works like (Kharraz and Kirda, 2017; Scaife et al.,
2016) present results with hundreds of samples, however, not every
ransomware sample encrypts ﬁles in network shared volumes. We have
removed any sample that does only encrypt local ﬁles. This is the reason
why famous ransomware families like “TorrentLocker” and “Matrix” are
not present in the experimental results. Other ransomware families are
not active any longer due to the removal of their C&C servers, so no
further experimentation with them is possible.
From the analysis of the traﬃc between the infected host and the
ﬁler we have recognised 3 types of general behaviours in the samples:
• Type I - The malware reads the original ﬁle, it creates a new ﬁle
with a diﬀerent name or extension and it writes in the new ﬁle
the encrypted content from the original one. Finally, it deletes the
original ﬁle and proceeds to the next one.
• Type II - It is similar to type I but the encrypted content is written
over the original ﬁle, not in a new one.
• Type III - It is similar to type II but after overwriting the content
it renames the ﬁle, adding an extension speciﬁc to the ransomware
strain
This classiﬁcation is similar to the one oﬀered in Scaife et al. (2016),
but we have a diﬀerent view of the ransomware behaviour. We analyse
the ransomware from the network traﬃc it creates instead of having
access to I/O disk access system calls.
After analysing the traﬃc generated by each of these samples of
ransomware in action we extract the following common characteristics:
(A) It must read ﬁles. This is necessary in order to create the
encrypted versions.
(B) It must write ﬁles, with a similar amount of bytes to those read.
These are the encrypted ﬁles. They can be newly created ﬁles or
it can overwrite existing ones.
(C) It must destroy information, either deleting or overwriting ﬁles.
(D) Read and write actions will be close in time. They could even be
in parallel.
(E) It tries to do the read, write and delete actions fast.
We have witnessed the above-mentioned behaviour in all the sam-
ples we have analysed. Crypto-ransomware can not avoid any of the
these characteristics. Reading the ﬁles and writing a similar amount of
bytes for the encrypted versions is obviously unavoidable (character-
istics A and B). It must also delete the information in disk (C) or else
there is no point in asking for a ransom. Read and write actions must
be close in time (D) because in between the malware is encrypting the
data. Both actions can be separated in time if the aﬀected ﬁle is large
but only to the extent of the available RAM. Finally, if the ransomware
were not doing these actions fast (characteristic E) it would not delete
many ﬁles before a periodic backup takes place, therefore losing much
of its impact.
4. Ransomware detection algorithm
We have revised the literature on methodologies for ransomware
detection, in order to possibly adapt previous proposals to the network
Table 2
List of ransomware samples.
Family Versions Date of appearance behaviour type Number of samples
VirLock VirLock December 2014 I 1
CTBLocker CTBLocker v4.0 January 2015 I 3
Teslacrypt TeslaCrypt v3.0 February 2015 III 1
TorrentLocker CryptoFortress March 2015 III 1
DMALocker DMALocker January 2016 III 1
Locky Locky v1.0, Aesir, Odin, Osiris, Diablo6 February 2016 III 10
Cerber Cerber v2.0, v4.0, v4.1.6, v5.0, v4.1, Red Cerber March 2016 III 15
CryptXXX CryptMIC v5.001 April 2016 II 1
Bart Bart v2.0 June 2016 I 1
CryptoMix CryptFile2 June 2016 I 10
Crysis Crysis, Dharma November 2016 III 1
Sage Sage v2.0 December 2016 III 1
MRCR MRCR1 December 2016 III 1
Spora Spora January 2017 II 1
WannaCry WannaCry v2.0 February 2017 I 2
BTCWare Aleta March 2017 III 1
Jaﬀ Jaﬀ June 2017 III 1
Globe GlobeImposter v2.0 June 2017 III 1
Zeus Zeus May 2018 I 1
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shared volumes scenario. In this section we describe their parameters
and applicability. Afterwards, we present the new algorithm we propose
(REDFISH) and we adjust its parameters, based on a training scenario.
Finally, we describe analytical models for both the successful detection
and false positives from the algorithm.
4.1. Parameter selection
Table 3 shows the main proposals in the literature and the input
parameters they use for ransomware detection. Most of them deploy
the detection software locally on the possibly infected computer. They
analyse the ransomware behaviour locally. Some of them take as input
parameter the network traﬃc from the host, but we could not ﬁnd any
work on the literature about detecting ransomware action based on the
traﬃc to network shared volumes.
This is the meaning of the columns in Table 3:
• File content: Methods based on ﬁle content require access to the
byte values read and/or written. They usually compare the original
content to the new values overwriting the ﬁle. They could also use
entropy calculations in order to recognise possibly encrypted con-
tent.
File sharing protocols are a network implementation of
Input/Output (I/O) system calls, therefore their traﬃc oﬀers
the ﬁle content when the user reads or writes a ﬁle. However,
we do not consider this parameter for three reasons: a) entropy
computation increases the CPU load on the analysis probe, b)
entropy increments could be very small if the original ﬁle was
already encrypted or compressed and c) comparing old and new
ﬁle content requires a large memory footprint and time consuming
searches. This kind of ﬁle content analysis in real time at 10Gb/s or
larger speeds is expensive, so any proposal that requires ﬁle content
analysis is discarded.
• I/O calls: The anti-malware software inspects all the disk-related sys-
tem calls used by the programs. The analysis software knows when
a ﬁle was opened or closed, its ﬁle path, when bytes were read or
written, etc, but no access to the ﬁle content is required.
A traﬃc monitoring probe that tracks network ﬁle sharing protocol
messages has access to this kind of information.
• API (Application Programming Interface) calls: The anti-malware
software inspects function calls used by suspected ransomware pro-
grams. The suspicious functions are usually related to cryptographic
operations.
A traﬃc monitoring probe has no access to function calls local to
the host. Any proposal that requires inspecting software behaviour
diﬀerent from disk access must be discarded in the present scenario.
• File stats: The detection algorithm bases its decision on the ﬁle
extensions in ﬁles created by the ransomware, the ﬁle extensions
in ﬁles it accesses (amount of diﬀerent extensions and values), etc.
The detection uses meta-data about the ﬁles accessed by the ran-
somware.
This information is available in the ﬁle sharing network protocol.
• Canary ﬁles: Special ﬁles are created in many directories. The anti-
malware software monitors any access to these ﬁles. A user will not
touch those ﬁles but ransomware software will try to encrypt them.
A network monitoring probe could detect when a canary ﬁle is
accessed. However, the procedure of creating the canary ﬁles in
the ﬁle sharing volume is not straight forward to implement in the
probe. All the proposals that use canary ﬁles ((Kharraz et al., 2015;
Feng and Liu, 2017)) use also the analysis of API calls, therefore all
of them are discarded.
• Binary analysis: The anti-malware software analyses the binary of
the program to run, searching for strings or speciﬁc function calls.
This information is not available in any network traﬃc.
• Network: Control traﬃc is analysed in order to detect the ran-
somware. Some methods monitor DNS resolution requests to spe-
ciﬁc black-listed domains ((Cabaj and Mazurczyk, 2016; Hasan and
Rahman, 2017)), they try to detect dynamically generated domain
names (Ahmadian et al., 2015; Quinkert et al.,) or they try to recog-
nise the exchange of messages and encryption keys with the com-
mand and control servers ((Lu et al., 2017; Hasan and Rahman,
2017)).
In order to monitor Internet traﬃc (DNS, traﬃc to command and
control servers) the probe requires access to this traﬃc. This requires
a complex probe deployment in some scenarios, compared to just
installing the probe close to the ﬁle server. In some scenarios it is
almost impossible to accomplish this deployment, for example when
the users are spread through hundreds of remote oﬃces and their
Internet traﬃc does not use a single network link.
From this analysis we see that any method based on ﬁle content, API
calls, canary ﬁles or binary analysis must be discarded. Those are the
methods that check one or more of the ﬁrst four columns in Table 3.
Only (Cabaj and Mazurczyk, 2016; Quinkert et al.,) are left, however,
network traﬃc information in these papers refers to Internet traﬃc,
which is not available in the scenario under analysis.
I/O calls and ﬁle stats are the basic information accessible from the
traﬃc with the ﬁle server. Every ransomware we have observed reads
the contents of ﬁles and writes the encrypted version in a diﬀerent ﬁle
in the same directory or over the original content in the same ﬁle. We
Table 3
Parameters used in the literature.
Method File content API calls Canary ﬁles Binary analysis I/O calls File stats Network
N. Scaife et al. (2016) ✓ ✓
A. Kharraz et al. (2015) ✓ ✓ ✓
D. Sgandurra et al. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
F. Mbol et al. (2016) ✓
A. Continella et al. (2016) ✓ ✓ ✓
M. Shukla et al. (2016) ✓ ✓ ✓
A. Kharraz and Kirda (2017) ✓ ✓ ✓
R. Vinayakumar et al. (2017) ✓
M. Alam et al. ✓
M. M. Ahmadian and Shahriari (2016) ✓ ✓
Y. Feng and Liu (2017) ✓ ✓
K. Cabaj and Mazurczyk (2016) ✓
M. M. Ahmadian et al. (2015) ✓ ✓ ✓
F. Quinkert et al. ✓
A. Kharraz et al. (2016) ✓ ✓
H. Kim et al. (2017) ✓ ✓
E. Kolodenker et al. (2017) ✓ ✓
T. Lu et al. (2017) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
M. M. Hasan and Rahman (2017) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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Table 4
Parameters used in REDFISH algorithm.
Parameter Units Explanation
N Minimum number of ﬁles deleted
T seconds Maximum time interval containing N deleted events
Vthres bits per second Minimum average read and write speed
will detect ransomware activity based on the destruction of information
or the removal of several ﬁles in the same period as an intensive bidi-
rectional (read and write) disk access activity is measured. The destruc-
tion could come from a delete command or from overwriting the data.
We will refer to both cases as a deletion event. The parameters in the
algorithm (Table 4), computed from the I/O calls in the ﬁle sharing
protocols, are:
• N: The minimum number of ﬁles deleted in order to trigger the
alarm. It must be a small value in order to detect ransomware activ-
ity before a large amount of ﬁles is deleted, which could incur in
more work for their recovery (see section 6 about ﬁle recovery).
However, if N is too small, the algorithm could confuse normal user
action with ransomware activity.
• T (seconds): All the removal events must take place in a time interval
of T seconds. Ransomware is expected to delete ﬁles quickly, so
short values of T will be adequate.
• Vthres (bits per second): During the time interval with the N deletion
events the throughput reading and writing ﬁles must exceed this
average speed.
In the following subsections we present the details of the algorithm
operation and provide values for parameters N, T and Vthres in order to
achieve 100% ransomware detection.
4.2. Deﬁnitions for algorithm description
As a general framework, let {𝜌i}, i ∈ ℕ be the discrete-time contin-
uous random arrival process for the events of ﬁle read operations; {𝜔i}
is a similar process for the write operations and {𝜏 i} for the events of
ﬁle deletion. A deletion event takes place at the time instant when a
ﬁle handler is closed for a ﬁle where some data was overwritten or a
deletion command was issued. We assume that two events cannot take
place at exactly the same time. This is always true from the traﬃc mon-
itor point of view as traﬃc is received in a serialized manner through
the port mirror.
REDFISH algorithm processes the above mentioned events in a time
sequential manner. For the ﬁle deletion events random process we also
deﬁne the interarrival time process {tk} where tk = 𝜏k+1 − 𝜏k, k ∈ ℕ.
We will use this last deﬁnition for the analytical model in the following
sections.
For each read, write or delete event we can associate a ﬁle system
path where the aﬀected ﬁle was located. We extract this path from the
SMB CREATE command when the ﬁle is opened, excluding the ﬁle name
and extension. We name p𝜌i the path for the ﬁle where a read operation
took place at 𝜌i. In an analogous way we deﬁne p𝜔i and p𝜏i . We call Q
the set of all possible ﬁle system paths. We assume all operations are
from the same shared volume.
We deﬁne b𝜌i and b𝜔i as the amount of bytes in a corresponding read
or write operation. For each ﬁle system path p we deﬁne Pp(t) (equation
(1)) as the cumulative amount of bytes read from ﬁles contained in that
directory (not in subdirectories). In a similar manner we deﬁne Ωp(t)
(equation (2)) for the written bytes.
Pp(t) =
∑
i
b𝜌i ,∀i ∈ ℕ ∣ 𝜌i ≤ t and p𝜌i = p Pp(0) = 0,∀p ∈ Q (1)
Ωp(t) =
∑
i
b𝜔i ,∀i ∈ ℕ ∣ 𝜔i ≤ t and p𝜔i = p Ωp(0) = 0,∀p ∈ Q (2)
For the whole ﬁlesystem (the network shared volume) we deﬁne
P(t) and Ω(t) as the cumulative amount of bytes read or written in the
volume (equations (3) and (4)).
P(t) =
∑
∀p∈Q
Pp(t) (3)
Ω(t) =
∑
∀p∈Q
Ωp(t) (4)
The amount of bytes read by the ransomware in a ﬁle system path
may diﬀer from the amount written in the same path, but they should
be similar, as the encrypted versions of the ﬁles will have a similar
size to the original ones. In order to reduce the eﬀect from the noise
created by normal read and write actions by the user we deﬁne mp(t)
as the minimum between the amounts of bytes read and written in
directory p (equation (5)). We also deﬁne m(t) as the minimum between
the amounts of bytes read and written in the whole volume (equation
(6)).
mp(t) = min{Pp(t),Ωp(t)} (5)
m(t) = min{P(t),Ω(t)} (6)
For the k-th deleted ﬁle (k ≥ N), the time interval comprising the
last N deletion events is ΔN𝜏k (equation (7)).
ΔN𝜏k = 𝜏k − 𝜏k−N+1 =
k−1∑
i=k−N+1
ti (7)
We compute V[k] (equation (8)) as an average speed of read&write
operation in the paths where those k ﬁles were deleted. V∗[k] is com-
puted as the average speed of read&write operations in the whole vol-
ume during those k delete operations (equation (9)). The set of paths
where those events took place is D = {p𝜏i}, ∀i ∈ ℕ ∣ k− N + 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The amount of bytes for the speed computations can be obtained from
the increments in m(t) and mp(t) for those paths. The time interval when
this activity took place goes from the ﬁrst time mp(t) got an increment in
any of those paths until the last deletion event 𝜏k. We name 𝜏∗ the time
when this ﬁrst increment took place. 𝜏∗ is the minimum value among
the time values 𝜂i when the corresponding mp𝜏i (t) got incremented, for
any of the paths in set D (equation (10)).
V[k] =
∑k
i=k−N+1 (mp𝜏i (𝜏k) −mp𝜏i (𝜏
∗))
𝜏k − 𝜏∗
(8)
V∗[k] =
∑k
i=k−N+1 (m(𝜏k) −m(𝜏∗))
𝜏k − 𝜏∗
(9)
𝜏∗ = min
k−N+1≤i≤k
{𝜂i}, k − N + 1 ≤ i ≤ k (10)
We can express 𝜂i as shown in equation (11). For each deletion event
𝜏 i the corresponding 𝜂i is the ﬁrst timestamp when mp𝜏i (t) increases
from the value at the previous deletion event 𝜏 j in the same path.
𝜂i ∈ ℝ ∣ 𝜂i < 𝜏i
p𝜏j = p𝜏i
mp𝜏j (𝜏j) < mp𝜏i (𝜂i)
mp𝜏i (t) = mp𝜏i (𝜏j),∀𝜏j ≤ t < 𝜂i
(11)
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Fig. 2. Example of the increment in algorithm counters.
Based on these deﬁnitions, in the following subsections we describe
two detection algorithms and analytical models for the estimation of
detection and failure rates.
4.3. One-phase detection algorithm: REDFISH1
Benign applications that only read or only write ﬁles in the directory
will not increment mp(t). Ransomware increments both mp(t) and m(t)
substantially while encrypting user ﬁles.
REDFISH1 algorithm will raise an alarm when ﬁles are deleted but
only if two additional conditions are true.
The ﬁrst condition requires the clustering of delete events in time.
If ΔN𝜏k > T then the events are too far apart to be consistent with ran-
somware action and an alarm will not be raised at 𝜏k. If ΔN𝜏k ≤ T then
enough events are clustered together, which could indicate ransomware
activity. This is the ﬁrst necessary condition for raising the alarm.
We require a second condition, based on the speed reading and writ-
ing those ﬁles. If V[k] > Vthres then the alarm is triggered at 𝜏k.
Fig. 2 shows an example of the events and values during REDFISH1
operation with N=5. For clarity, all the deletion events shown take
place in the same ﬁle system path p. The vertical lines mark these
events. They take place when the ﬁle is truncated or when the ﬁle
handle is closed for a ﬁle that has been marked for deletion using the
SET INFO command or for a ﬁle whose content has been overwritten
(partially or totally). The time series mp(t) for the selected path is also
included in the ﬁgure. The time interval Δ5𝜏5 contains the last 5 dele-
tion events. The time when mp(t) increased its value from 𝜏0 is 𝜂1, also
included in the ﬁgure. In the example, an alarm is raised if:
𝜏5 − 𝜏1 < T and
mp(𝜏5) −mp(𝜏1)
𝜏5 − 𝜂1
> Vthres
If more system paths contain deletion events then they are included
in the computation of the amount of bytes read&written and also in
computing the beginning of the time interval using equations (10) and
(11).
We include a pseudo-code implementation of REDFISH1 (Algo-
rithm 1).
4.4. Two-phase detection algorithm: REDFISH2
The value ofmp(t) increases only if the encrypted versions of the ﬁles
are created in the same path as each original ﬁle. This is the behaviour
we have witnessed in every ransomware sample we have obtained, and
it is unavoidable for any ransomware that overwrites the original ﬁle.
However, a new ransomware sample, aware of REDFISH1 algorithm,
could try to avoid detection by creating the encrypted ﬁle in a diﬀerent
path, not increasing the value ofmp(t) and therefore showing low values
of V[k]. This could result in undetected ransomware samples.
We must highlight that we have not found any ransomware sample
showing this behaviour. All of them overwrite the original ﬁle or create
a new one in the same path. However, we propose REDFISH2 in order
to cope with potential future ransomware samples that could choose
this strategy.
REDFISH2 is an extension to REDFISH1. It keeps the rules from
REDFISH1, therefore any ransomware detected by REDFISH1 will be
detected by REDFISH2 with the same eﬃciency. REDFISH2 adds a sec-
ond set of rules, executed in case of no detection with REDFISH1. It
detects ransomware samples that could be overlooked by REDFISH1
due to the same-path condition. To achieve this goal, it uses V∗[k].
V∗[k] provides the read&write speed from this user in the whole
shared volume. It is aﬀected by processes that read ﬁles in a ﬁlesystem
path while other processes write ﬁles in a diﬀerent path. Therefore,
it can result in a high rate of false alarms. In order to not increase
the number of false alarms using REDFISH2, the values for minimum
number of ﬁles deleted and minimum V∗[k] will be tuned diﬀerently.
We deﬁne a second triplet of values N∗, T∗ and V∗thres. These are
equivalent to N, T and Vthres but they are only used in the second set of
rules in REDFISH2.
The implementation in pseudo-code of REDFISH2 is very similar to
the algorithm shown for REDFISH1 (Algorithm 1), so we omit it. First,
the checks in REDFISH1 are carried. In case of no alarm, a new set of
equivalent checks is carried, this time changing N to N∗, T to T∗, Vthres
to V∗thres and carrying the computation of bytesR and bytesW ignoring of
the ﬁlesystem path.
4.5. Parameter tuning
We tune the values for the parameters (N,T,Vthres) in REDFISH1
and (N∗,T∗,V∗thres) in REDFISH2 in order to reduce the amount of false
alarms (false positives) and maximize true detections. We proceed ﬁrst
with the parameters for REDFISH1, as they are also used in REDFISH2.
4.5.1. Parameters in REDFISH1
Our goal is the fast detection of every ransomware strain. Our mea-
surement of detection speed will be based on the number of ﬁles lost
before the ransomware is detected. The parameter N is the minimum
number of deleted ﬁles before the algorithm can trigger the alarm,
therefore a low value of N is recommended. We will show that we detect
the ransomware activity in all the samples (100% success rate) with a
number of lost ﬁles close to the minimum value N, using small values
of N (around N=10).
Anomaly detection systems are prone to false positive alarms (Vidal
et al., 2017; Sari, 2015). It is usually considered better to have some
false positives than to fail on the detection of a zero-day attack (Liao
et al., 2013). However, false positives are dangerous, as they reduce
user conﬁdence in the detection system, increasing the possibility that
he could ignore a true alarm. Therefore, we aim not only for 100%
ransomware detection rate but also for zero false positives. In order to
reach this goal we use the eight one-day-long traﬃc traces we have col-
lected in two diﬀerent user and network scenarios. To summarize the
procedure followed, we take the parameter value space (N,T,Vthres) and
reduce it to the subset of conﬁgurations for which all the ransomware
strains are detected and no false alarm would be triggered for the train-
ing trace. In order to achieve this objective, for every value of (N,T)
we select the value of Vthres such that no false positive will be triggered.
Within this subset we search for the values that oﬀer 100% ransomware
detection with the lowest N value, in order to detect the malware with
the minimum number of ﬁles lost.
We search for the best combination of parameters using a single
training trace. Once we ﬁnd a suitable operational point, we check the
number of false positives using the rest of the traces with normal user
behaviour. Even though we select the parameters for no false positives,
this will be guaranteed only for the training trace, so we must check,
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Algorithm 1 REDFISH1.
deleteEvtList ← new empty list of Event(t,minBytes)
bytesR← new empty dictionary of Bytes(path)
bytesW ← new empty dictionary of Bytes(path)
procedure REDFISH1CHECKFORRANSOMWARE
path← path from SMB message
if type in SMB message=READ then
bytesR(path) + = bytes read in SMB message
if type in SMB message=WRITE then
bytesW(path) + = bytes written in SMB message
if (type in SMB message=WRITE) or (type in SMB message=REMOVE FILE) or (type
in SMB message=TRUNCATE FILE) then
deleteEvent ← new Event
t in deleteEvent ← time in SMB message
minBytes in deleteEvent ← min(bytesR(path), bytesW(path))
add deleteEvent to deleteEvtList
bytesR(path)← 0
bytesW(path)← 0
while t in deleteEvent − min(t fromallEvent in deleteEvtList) > T
do
remove oldest Event from deleteEvtList
if numberof elements indeleteEvtList = N then
RWbytes← sum(minBytes from all Event in deleteEvtList)
RWspeed← RWbytes∕(max(t indeleteEvtList) − min(t in deleteEvtList))
if RWspeed>Vthres then
rise Alarm
else if number of elements in deleteEvtList > N then
remove oldest Event from deleteEvtList
using other traces, that the parameters provide good results. We detail
the results from each step in the following paragraphs.
We apply the detection algorithm to the traﬃc trace Campus0 as the
training trace, with a value of Vthres = 0 and a wide range of values for
N and T. This is a trace where no ransomware was present. For every
(false) alarm situation, we record the measured value of V. Fig. 3 shows
the maximum value of V recorded in any alarm for each pair of values
(N,T), which we call Vthres(N,T). This is the minimum value of Vthres
which assures that for this traﬃc trace there will be no alarms, as no
one took place with a higher value of V.
High values of T take to more alarm cases in the training trace.
The reason behind this is that a user is more likely to delete N ﬁles
in a larger time interval. Having more alarm cases takes to a larger
Vthres(N,T), that corresponds to the worst-case alarm. This increase in
Vthres(N,T) reaches a maximum for values of T > 30 s, which depends
on N. It is expected that a higher value of Vthres(N,T) will take to more
cases of real ransomware action that will not reach that throughput,
therefore it takes to worse results in positive detection.
Fig. 3. Maximum measured V, which translates into the threshold value of V
that assures no false alarms in the training trace Campus0. Values of Vthres = 0
are not plotted due to the logarithmic scale. A interpolation is added for clarity,
even though N takes only integer values.
For small values of N it is easier to ﬁnd cases where the user deletes
N ﬁles in a short period of time, therefore increasing the number of
alarm situations and the value of Vthres(N,T). Fig. 4a shows the value of
Vthres(N,T) ﬁxing the value of N. Values of N larger than 5 are advised;
they provide low values of Vthres(N,T) which, as will be shown later,
oﬀer fast ransomware detection.
Fig. 4b shows the value of Vthres(N,T) ﬁxing the value of T. When
N > 7 the value of Vthres(N,T) is always below 3Mb/s, for any value of
T. These rates are below those expected for read or write operation on
any disk array in an oﬃce environment.
We check the algorithm detection capabilities using the ransomware
traces presented in section 3. For every tuple (N,T,Vthres(N,T)) and
every ransomware traﬃc trace we run the algorithm from the begin-
ning of ransomware action. When the alarm is triggered we measure
the amount of ﬁles that were lost and the time elapsed until that point.
We reset the algorithm on that point and let it continue running with
the rest of the trace until another alarm is raised. With this procedure
we simulate a situation where the detection algorithm could start run-
ning in almost any point of time when the ransomware is already active.
With these data we can obtain the number of cases where the minimum
number of ﬁles N is lost or how much time elapsed on average until
ransomware detection.
Fig. 5 shows the percentage of cases where exactly N ﬁles were lost
before ransomware detection, using a conﬁguration (N,T,Vthres(N,T))
and the ransomware traﬃc traces. Having just N deletion events is the
best expected result, as the alarm cannot be raised before that amount
of ﬁles is lost. We have marked using a darker colour in Fig. 5 the con-
ﬁguration cases for which no ransomware sample escapes undetected
(100% true positive detection). The worst detection results are obtained
when simultaneously a small value of T and a large value of N are con-
ﬁgured (lower-left corner in Fig. 5). In this range not all ransomware
samples are detected and there is a drop to less than 50% of the cases
where we lose only N ﬁles before ransomware detection (if it is detected
at all). The best results are obtained for large values of both T and N.
For small values of N, Fig. 4b shows that the conﬁgured Vthres for
no false positives is large (tens of Mb/s). This Vthres takes to more cases
where the ransomware does not reach that throughput with the mini-
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Fig. 4. Threshold values of V that assure no false alarms with training trace Campus0.
Fig. 5. Percentage of cases where only N ﬁles are lost with an algorithm con-
ﬁguration with no false positives with the training traﬃc trace.
mum number of ﬁles lost, but requires more time to trigger the alarm.
For N ≥ 7 and T ≥ 20 s, the probability of detection with the minimum
number of ﬁles lost is above 90%, getting above 98% for N ≥ 10. 100%
detection is achieved with larger values of lost ﬁles.
After this training process we select N=10 ﬁles and T=20 s as the
reference conﬁguration values for REDFISH1.
N ﬁles must be lost before the ransomware is detected. However,
this event can take place in a very short time. Fig. 6 shows the com-
plementary cumulative distribution function for the time until the ran-
somware is detected with a conﬁguration of N=10 ﬁles, T=20 s and
Vthres = 107 Kb∕s. For 99% of the cases it takes less than 20 s before
exactly 10 ﬁles are lost and the alarm is triggered. For 90% of the cases
it takes less than 4 s to detect ransomware action. The alarm can be
triggered before the time interval T is expired, as long as enough ﬁles
are destroyed and the disk activity reading and writing is above the
threshold.
4.5.2. Parameters added in REDFISH2
All the available ransomware samples are detected using REDFISH1
procedure. However, for the case of ransomware that violates the same-
path condition we tune the parameters (N∗,T∗,V∗thres) in the extra secu-
rity check implemented in REDFISH2. The recommended values for
(N,T,Vthres) in REDFISH2 are the same as the ones for REDFISH1.
Fig. 7 shows the pairs of (N∗,T∗) that result in no false positives
for the training trace when V∗thres = 0. For example, using T∗ = 20 s
and N∗ ≥ 40 there are no false positives. The global speed V∗[k] is
sensitive to any disk operation from benign software so it is normal
that we obtain N∗ > N. The smallest values of N∗ are obtained for
the smallest T∗. It is not reasonable to use a value of T∗ smaller than
T, therefore, T∗ = T = 20 s is the minimum or optimum value for
Fig. 6. Complementary cumulative distribution function for the time until the
ransomware is detected (T = 20 s,N = 10,Vthres = 107Kb∕s).
T. Using T∗ = 20 s we only require N∗ = 40 in order to achieve 0
false positives. However, this is only guaranteed for the training trace.
Taking into consideration that V∗[k] is very sensitive to normal user
actions, it is advisable to select a larger value of N∗. We select to
enlarge 25% the minimum value, obtaining N∗ = 50. We provide
in a diﬀerent section a sensitivity analysis on this parameter. Using
T∗ = 20 s and N∗ = 50 there is no need for a value of V∗thres larger than
0, however, we select V∗thres = Vthres in order to remove possible false
positives. The value selected for Vthres is small and it will be shown that
it does not block the detection of any ransomware.
With this set of parameters, we run REDFISH2 using the ransomware
samples in Table 2, but ignoring the path where each read or write oper-
ation takes places. This way, only the extra rules in REDFISH2 will be
able to detect the ransomware. This simulates a worst case scenario
where disk operations from ransomware take place in completely unre-
lated ﬁlesystem paths from each other. The results show 100% detec-
tion rate (all ransomware samples are detected). 93.18% of the alarms
raised when the 50th ﬁle was deleted. For 95% of the cases the alarm
was triggered before 63 ﬁles were lost and for 99% of the alarms, less
than 104 ﬁles were lost.
4.6. Analytical model for ransomware detection
In order to measure the eﬀectiveness of the detection proposal we
provide an analytical evaluation of both the probability of ransomware
detection with minimum ﬁle losses (true positives) and the probability
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Fig. 7. Combinations of (N∗,T∗,0) that result in no false positives in REDFISH2
for the training trace.
of false alarms (false positives).
The detection of ransomware is based on two events that must take
place simultaneously:
• Event eT: At least N deletion events take place in less than T seconds.
• Event erw: The data rate of bytes read&written between ﬁrst and last
deletion event is at least Vthres.
If both events happen when the traﬃc is from normal user activity,
we say that a false positive detection took place. If not both events hap-
pen when the traﬃc contains ransomware action, then the algorithm
misses an early detection. It can still detect the ransomware but it will
take more than N lost ﬁles. Obviously we want any of these incidents
to be very rare.
Let ℙ(eT) be the probability of event eT from an initial deletion event
and ℙ(erw ∣ eT ) be the probability of V exceeding Vthres in the time period
when eT takes place. The alarm rises when both events eT and erw take
place. This corresponds to probability ℙ(eT ∩ erw). As an approximation
we suppose that both events eT and erw are independent, and as an
upper bound we take a worst case of ℙ(erw) = 1. We will later prove
that this last hypothesis is reasonable. Then, as shown in equation (12),
we can approximate the target probability by the probability of eT.
ℙ(eT ∩ erw) = ℙ(eT )ℙ(erw ∣ eT ) = ℙ(eT )ℙ(erw) ≤ ℙ(eT) (12)
In order for eT event to take place, at least N ﬁles must be deleted in
less than T seconds. On the following sections we provide an estimation
of the probability of detecting the ransomware right when the N-th ﬁle
is lost by oﬀering and analytical model for ℙ(eT ). We also estimate the
false alarm probability for a large population of users. This last result is
based on REDFISH algorithm and a model for normal user behaviour.
4.6.1. Probability of ransomware fast detection with minimum ﬁle losses
Ransomware reads a ﬁle, writes its encrypted content and removes
the original ﬁle. The last step could be omitted if the encrypted version
overwrites the original ﬁle, however the original unencrypted ﬁle con-
tent is always lost. The ﬁles are encrypted sequentially, so a time series
of deletion events {𝜏k} is created, where the time between these events
{tk} is the result of the time it takes to read, encrypt and write each ﬁle.
During each time interval tk the ransomware reads, encrypts and
writes a ﬁle; therefore this time must correlate to the ﬁle sizes, as
larger ﬁles take more time to transfer from the network ﬁle share to
the infected host and back.
We use the model described in section 3 for the distribution of ﬁle
sizes in a typical user disk. File k has size sk and all the sk are i.i.d.
random variables. The ﬁles are distributed across the directory struc-
ture and the ransomware typically does some kind of deep breadth ﬁrst
directory tree traversal (Scaife et al., 2016). Each sk is a combination
of a lognormal random variable and a Pareto tail. We approximate the
random variable with a lognormal, as it generates more than 99.99% of
the values (Agrawal et al., 2009). Equation (13) deﬁnes the probabil-
ity density function (PDF) for the lognormal random variable, based on
two parameters 𝜇 and 𝜎.
fLN(x) =
1
𝜎x
√
2𝜋
e
−(lnx−𝜇)2
2𝜎2 (13)
We estimate the tk random variable based on the ﬁle size to trans-
fer and a constant transfer speed s. The resulting tk = sk∕s are i.i.d.
random variables following a lognormal distribution. The parameter s
depends on the transfer speed between the user host and the ﬁler. This
parameter is inﬂuenced by the available network capacity, user host
processing speed, ﬁler ﬁle access speed, number of simultaneous users
and SMB and TCP protocol parameters (windows sizes, delay acknowl-
edgements, congestion avoidance algorithms, etc.). File access speeds in
nowadays enterprise networks are in the range of hundreds of megabits
per second. Lower transfer speeds would seriously hamper ﬁle sharing
users and therefore are infrequent in an enterprise-grade local area net-
work. The proposed detection algorithm could behave worse for lower
speeds. Hence, we assume a very conservative worst case range from
10Mb/s to 100Mb/s transfer speed per user, while typical enterprise-
class network sharing appliances provide several 10Gb/s network links
(Isilon All-Flash Scale-Out NAS Storage; QNAP).
In this scenario, ΔN𝜏k is the sum of N lognormal i.i.d. random vari-
ables. Its PDF is the convolution of N lognormal PDFs. There is no
known closed form for this convolution. The PDF can also be computed
from the product of the characteristic function of N lognormal random
variables. However, the characteristic function for the lognormal distri-
bution is also not known. The research literature oﬀers many published
works with diﬀerent approximations to the distribution of the sum of
N lognormal random variables (Zhang and Song, 2008; Beaulieu and
Rajwani, 2004; Nie and Chen, 2007; Lam and Le-Ngoc, 2006). We have
selected the systematic procedure oﬀered in Zhang and Song (2008),
based on the Pearson’s family of functions.
Based on the lognormal parameters recommended from Agrawal et
al. (2009), the PDF for the selected distribution is shown in equation
(14) (Pearson type-IV), where the parameters u, d, m, and v are com-
puted from the lognormal sample and k is a scaling factor for a total
cumulative probability of 1. For brevity, we show only the results from
the procedure, and we refer the reader to (Zhang and Song, 2008) for
more details.
fIV (x) = k
(
1+ (x + u)
2
d2
)−m
e−vtan−1(
x+u
d ) (14)
Fig. 8 shows the probability of not detecting the ransomware when
the tenth ﬁle is lost, obtained from the above-mentioned approxima-
tion. This is the probability that the sum of the N=10 lognormal ran-
dom variables results in a value above T=20 s. The probability is below
0.01 for transfer speeds larger than 12.7Mb/s. For a network with
100Mb/s transfer speeds between host and ﬁler the probability of not
detecting the ransomware when the tenth ﬁle is lost is below 0.001
(0.1%).
We must highlight that this last result does not mean that in 0.1%
of the cases the ransomware would not be detected. It only means that
it will not be detected when the tenth ﬁle is lost but it will be detected
later. For example, in case the probability of missing the ransomware
in the 10th deletion event is 0.001 then the probability of missing it
also when the 20th ﬁle is lost is at most 1 − (0.001)2 = 0.999999, or
more than “ﬁve-nines”, which is a typical quality requirement in telecom
networks.
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Fig. 8. Analytical results for the probability of fast ransomware detection.
4.6.2. Estimation of ℙ(erw)
We have used a worst-case bound for ℙ(erw) = 1. We show now
a better approximation using a similar methodology to the previous
section.
Let s (constant) be the transfer speed and sk be the i.i.d. lognormal
random variables describing the ﬁle sizes (with lognormal parameters
𝜇 and 𝜎). When a program opens a ﬁle, it sends a CREATE Request
SMB message to the ﬁle server. Once the response is received, it can
send READ Requests in order to read the ﬁle content and later WRITE
Requests in order to write the encrypted version of the ﬁle. The amount
of bytes transferred is 2sk. These bytes are transferred at speed s, there-
fore it takes 2sk∕s seconds. Between the CREATE Request and the time
when the ﬁle starts being received there is a gap due to search times
at the ﬁle server hard disk (Fig. 9). If the disk is a mechanical drive
we can expect access times in the range of several milliseconds. Let te
the extra time in the whole operation, when no data is being trans-
ferred.
When N ﬁles are transferred following this procedure we can com-
pute and average transfer speed as shown in equation (15). The numer-
ator is the amount of bytes in the ﬁle sizes because REDFISH uses the
minimum value between bytes read and written. The denominator takes
into account both operations of read and write in the time interval, and
an overhead due to N ﬁles aﬀected. The event erw is the event of obtain-
ing an average measured speed above Vthres = 107Kb∕s when N = 10
ﬁles are deleted. Therefore ℙ(erw) = ℙ(ve > Vthres) and we only need to
compute this last value.
ve =
∑N
k=1 sk
Nte +
∑N
k=1
2sk
s
(15)
We use the deﬁnition of ve and obtain a result that depends on
NVthres∕s (equation (16)).
Fig. 9. Waiting times in ﬁle transfers.
ℙ(ve > Vthres) = ℙ
( ∑N
k=1 sk
Nte +
∑N
k=1
2sk
s
> Vthres
)
= ℙ
( N∑
k=1
sk >
NteVthres
1+ N 2Vthress
)
(16)
The value of s is in the range of several megabits per second, as it
correspond to the ﬁle transfer speed. We have selected Vthres at least
an order of magnitude smaller (107 kb/s). Therefore, we are interested
in computing ℙ(ve) in a range of values for which we can safely say
that 2NVthres << s, therefore 2NVthres∕s << 1 and equation (16) is just
approximately equation (17). For Vthres = 107Kb∕s and N = 10 this
requires s >> 2Mb∕s. We can therefore assume this approximation for
transfer speeds above tens of megabits per second.
ℙ(ve > Vthres) ≈ ℙ
( N∑
k=1
sk > NteVthres
)
(17)
Computing this last probability is straightforward. Based on a sim-
ilar procedure to previous section, sk are the i.i.d lognormal random
variables used for modeling ﬁle sizes, therefore ∑Nk=1 sk can be approx-
imated using the Pearson type-IV (equation (14)). From our experi-
ments, the value of te is in the range of a few tens of milliseconds,
however, it can depend on the response times from the hard disk in
the server. For te = 50ms (which can be considered large) the result is
ℙ(ve > Vthres) ≈ 0.9942 and for te = 10ms the result is ℙ(ve > Vthres) ≈
0.999948. We can therefore assume that for transfer speeds above tens
of megabits per second, ℙ(erw) ≈ 1.
4.6.3. Model for false detection probability
False positives take place for normal user activity (no ransomware
is active) when normal user deletion events cluster close together. In
order to estimate ℙ(eT ) we require a model for the normal user deletion
event times.
We take the experimental distribution for the time between deletion
events, tk, from the data in the training trace Campus0. Fig. 10 shows
the experimental cumulative distribution and a mean-squared-error ﬁt
using a Weibull distribution.
A Weibull random variable presents the cumulative distribution
function shown in equation (18), where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are the distribution
parameters.
ℙ(tk > x) = 1− e
−
( x
𝛽
)𝛼
, x ≥ 0 (18)
Fig. 10. Cumulative distribution function for the time between events (Campus0
traﬃc trace) and a ﬁt using a Weibull distribution.
25
D. Morato et al. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 124 (2018) 14–32
Based on (Yilmaz and Alouini, 2009) we can calculate the distri-
bution for ΔN𝜏k as the sum of N i.i.d. Weibull random variables. We
approximate the result using equation (19) from Johnson (1960).
ℙ(eT) = ℙ(ΔN𝜏k < T) = ℙ
( k−1∑
i=k−N+1
ti < T
)
≈ 1− e−
( p
𝛽
T
)𝛼 N−2∑
k=0
1
k!
(
c
𝛽
T
)𝛼k
= 1−
Γ
(
N− 1,
(
c
βT
)α)
Γ(N − 1)
(19)
Γ(n) is the gamma function, Γ(n, x) is the incomplete gamma func-
tion and c is computed using equation (20).
c =
Γ
(
N− 1+ 1α
)
(N − 1)! Γ
(
1+ 1α
) (20)
The mean-squared-error ﬁt shown in Fig. 10 provides estimated
parameter values of 𝛼 = 0.336 and 𝛽 = 100.8 for the Weibull distri-
bution. The resulting value of c is 17.82 and ℙ(eT) = 0.000032. This is
the probability of a false alarm for N=10 consecutive deletion events,
measured as the probability that 10 deletion events take place in less
than 20 s. For a single user there could exist several opportunities
along a single day when the alarm could be raised, simply because
he could delete more than N ﬁles and each group of N events provides
an alarm opportunity. If a single user deletes on average M ﬁles in a
single day, we can estimate a maximum number of alarm opportunities
opts = min{0, ⌊M − N + 1⌋}. Assuming independent events, the proba-
bility of one or more false alarms raising in a single day for one user
(puser) is just the result of equation (21).
puser = ℙ(alarms for single user 1 day ≥ 1) = 1− (1− ℙ(eT))opts (21)
We have estimated M from the behaviour of more than 300 users in
the training trace Campus0. The result is puser = 0.00022. Then, for a
population of 300 independent users the probability of at least one false
alarm during a whole day would be pday = 0.065 or 6.5%. Therefore,
the expected time until the ﬁrst false alarm would be around 15 days.
5. Experimental results
Parameter tuning for ransomware detection has been accomplished
using the whole set of ransomware samples presented in Table 2. For
N=10 ﬁles lost in a time interval of T=20 s, using Vthres = 107Kb∕s,
we obtained 100% ransomware detection with REDFISH1, with 99%
of the cases where the ransomware is detected immediately when the
tenth ﬁle is lost. In 99% of the cases the alarm raises less than 20 s after
ransomware action begins. These results have been obtained aggregat-
ing the behaviour from all the ransomware samples. However, there
could be ransomware families oﬀering better results at the expense
of other families that could present worse detection rates. In order to
detect this possible behaviour we analyse in this section each family
separately.
Even though no false positives are possible for the training trace they
could appear in other days or other network scenarios, due to changes
in user behaviour. In this section we check the results using other traces
in the same environment and also using a large traﬃc trace from a real
private business scenario.
5.1. Detection of diﬀerent ransomware families with REDFISH1
Fig. 11 shows, for each ransomware family, the percentage of cases
where the ransomware is detected with exactly N ﬁles lost, for a range
of values around N=10. For each value of N, a diﬀerent Vthres is con-
ﬁgured, according to the results from Fig. 3.
Most families present a slow improvement when N increases, reach-
ing optimal detection with percentages above 90% for N > 10. How-
ever, a few families show a steep improvement on that vicinity. For
Fig. 11. Percentage of cases where only N ﬁles are lost for T=20 s and each
ransomware family.
N < 10, “Revenge” and “CTBLocker” families oﬀer only 50% of cases
where the ransomware is detected with only N ﬁles lost. For N ≥ 10
they raise to 85% for “CTBLocker” and above 95% for “Revenge”.
“WannaCry”, for T=20 s, presents a diﬀerent behaviour, with low
sensitivity to changes in parameter N in the range from 4 to 16 ﬁles.
The encryption-and-deletion sequence for this family of ransomware is
slightly diﬀerent from the others. Instead of encrypting and then delet-
ing each ﬁle, it batches encryption and deletion events. After encrypting
a batch of around 200 ﬁles, it deletes all of them before starting a new
batch. The result is percentages of fast detection for a conﬁguration
with N > 10 slightly above 85%.
Increasing T to 120 s we can observe in Fig. 12 an improvement in
“WannaCry” detection, getting to percentages above 95%. This is at the
expense of slightly worse results for “CTBLocker”. For “CTBLocker”,
using T=20 s and N between 4 and 16 ﬁles lost, only in 70% of the
cases it is detected with exactly N ﬁles lost.
From Figs. 11 and 12 it is not clear whether in the rest of the cases
the ransomware is not detected, it is detected after a few more ﬁles are
lost or after many more ﬁles are lost. To clarify this point we show in
Fig. 13 the maximum number of ﬁles lost in 99% of the alarms. For
most families, in 99% of the cases the ransomware is detected before
2xN ﬁles are lost. For “CTBLocker”, 99% of the alarms raise before 80
Fig. 12. Percentage of cases where only N ﬁles are lost for T=120 s and each
ransomware family.
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Fig. 13. Maximum number of ﬁles lost for 99% of the alarms. T=20 s.
ﬁles are lost, with an average of around 20 ﬁles (the average is not
shown in the ﬁgure). Therefore, the results are still good in absolute
numbers. We will show in section 6 that those ﬁles are recoverable
from the traﬃc trace.
The explanation for the results from “CTBLocker” comes from its
special behaviour encrypting ﬁles. It does not only encrypt but it also
compresses the ﬁle. Disk-write activity is therefore much lower than
read activity and when the read&write speed threshold is high it results
in harder detection. This diversity in the behaviour of diﬀerent ran-
somware families serves as an additional validation of the algorithm
eﬀectiveness.
5.2. Validation of REDFISH1 on diﬀerent user scenarios
As shown in section 4, the combination of parameters T=20 s,
N=10 and Vthres = 107Kb∕s provides the best conﬁguration using
small values. However, the results could be very sensitive to small
changes in user activity. We test the results using diﬀerent traces and a
small set of parameters, in order to detect whether for other scenarios
they are a good choice or not.
Table 5 shows, for each traﬃc trace, the number of false positives for
each conﬁguration. It also shows the value of parameter N that results
in no false positives. The number of false positives is very small, even
for the Private traﬃc trace. We must highlight that this last trace con-
tains the activity from 4882 users, accessing a total of 1677 diﬀerent
SMB servers during a whole day (24 h). It even includes any late-night
automatic processes that could access the shared volumes.
For the CampusX traﬃc traces there is at most one false positive
per day. The results are as good for T=120 s as for T=20 s. For the
trace Campus1 the larger time interval T=120 s allows a false alarm to
appear that does not exist for T=20 s. In Campus6 the contrary happens
and an alarm that raises for T=20 s is not present for T=120 s. This is
probably due to the diﬀerent Vthres for each conﬁguration.
For the Private traﬃc trace there are at most 3 false alarms in the
whole day (using T=120 s). They are due to:
• Database ﬁle modiﬁcations: Files from database software are usually
overwritten when changes are applied. If several database ﬁles are
modiﬁed by the same user in a short time period, an alarm could
raise. This happens only once in the whole day because a user mod-
iﬁes 10 database ﬁles in less than 2min.
• Modiﬁcations to several Microsoft Excel ﬁles in a short time: This is
probably due to ﬁles linked among themselves. It happens twice in
the whole day, both cases for the same user.
These 3 false alarms are the only alarms during a whole day. During
this same day the users open collectively more than 40 million ﬁles
(Table 1). This an extremely low rate of false positives as only about 1
in 10 million opened ﬁles triggers a false alarm.
For T=120 s and N > 12 there are no false positives in the Private
traﬃc trace. For the CampusX traﬃc traces this is achieved using a
diﬀerent conﬁguration for each day. In the worst case we can guarantee
that using N=61 ﬁles lost there are no false positives any day.
5.3. Validation of REDFISH2
REDFISH2 extends the logic in REDFISH1 and obtains the same
detection results for all the available traces. It presents an advantage
only for still non existing ransomware behaviour. We have carried a
sensitivity analysis varying the parameters exclusive to REDFISH2 and
adapting the available ransomware samples for not triggering the alarm
in the part of the algorithm that is shared with REDFISH1. This analysis
shows whether REDFISH2 could detect these samples or not, how many
ﬁles would be lost and the number of extra false positive alarms that
could arise.
Table 6 shows the number of false positives for each of the sam-
ples in the two diﬀerent network scenarios. It also shows (column “N
lost”) the percentage of alarms that are triggered using the ransomware
samples right when the N∗th ﬁle is lost. We have varied the parame-
ter N∗, keeping the values of T∗ and V∗thres. For all the selected values
we achieve 100% detection rate, i.e. all the ransomware samples are
detected using exclusively REDFISH2 second set of rules. Even the traf-
ﬁc trace Private (containing the traﬃc from 4882 users) does not show
any extra false positive result. The percentage of alarms that stop the
ransomware when exactly N∗ ﬁles are lost is lower the larger the value
of N∗. This means that a very large N∗ is not advised, as both the alarm
cannot be triggered with less than N∗ ﬁles lost and the number of cases
with this optimal results gets reduced the larger the value of N∗.
We can state that REDFISH2 contains a low cost modiﬁcation of the
logic in REDFISH1, keeping its good results and adding only a small
Table 5
False positive events for diﬀerent conﬁgurations in REDFISH1.
T N Vthres (Kb/s) Number of false positives
Campus1 Campus2 Campus3 Campus4 Campus5 Campus6 Private
20 10 107 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
20 12 107 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
20 14 107 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
20 16 107 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
20 21 107 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
20 61 107 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
120 10 263 1 1 0 0 0 0 3
120 12 263 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
120 14 263 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
120 21 263 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
120 61 263 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 6
False positive events and ransomware detection rates for diﬀerent conﬁgurations in REDFISH2.
N∗ Number of false positives (T∗ = 20 s,V∗thres = 107 Kb∕s) N∗ lost N∗ (99%)
Campus1 Campus2 Campus3 Campus4 Campus5 Campus6 Private
50 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 93.18% 104
60 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 90.43% 175
70 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 89.6% 213
80 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 87.07% 291
risk of extra false alarms with a proper conﬁguration. As no existing
ransomware presents a behaviour that escapes REDFISH1 detection, the
alarms from REDFISH2 could be reduced to a “Warning” category, with
a reduced impact of any false positive.
5.4. Validation of analytical models
In section 4.6.1 we provided an approximated model for the prob-
ability of ransomware detection when the Nth ﬁle is lost. The result
depends on the distribution of ﬁle sizes accessed from the shared vol-
ume and the transfer speed between each client and the ﬁler.
We have conﬁgured a testbed similar to the one described in section
3.2.2, which was used to obtain the ransomware samples from Table 2.
We have improved the computing hardware in order to support a third
virtual machine, acting as an Ethernet bridge between the infected
client and the ﬁler. In the bridge we conﬁgured a rate limiting traﬃc
policy in order to modify the transfer speed. Using this testbed we ran a
sample of “Cerber”, still active, varying the transfer speed and obtaining
the detection results from REDFISH1 using the optimal parameters.
Fig. 14 shows the analytical results (the same as shown in Fig. 8)
compared to the experimental ones. Both curves are reasonable close
and the analytical one provides a worst case bound, as the curve is
always above the experimental one. The analytical model takes some
approximations for small values of transfer speed, however, it still
seems valid for values as small as 2Mb/s. The maximum rate limit-
ing values we could safely conﬁgure in the experimental testbed were
around 50Mb/s. We must highlight that it is a rate per user. Therefore,
in a real deployment where for example 300 users reach 50Mb/s each
one, we are loading the ﬁler with 15Gb/s. Therefore, the validation
range is reasonable.
In section 4.6.3 we provided an approximated model for the proba-
bility of false positives. It required a model for normal user behaviour,
that we obtained from the traﬃc traces. In order to validate this result
we have shown that in the seven traﬃc traces we have available, only a
Fig. 14. Analytical results for the probability of fast ransomware detection.
few false positives appear. The available data for validation is short, as
each full day of traﬃc provides only one sample. The analytical result
we have oﬀered was computed for a population of about 300 users.
As the traﬃc trace Private contains the traﬃc from 4882 users we can
assume that it is equivalent to approximately 16 one-day traces from
300 users each. In this set of 16 traces we obtain 2 false positive results.
With these results we test the null hypothesis that false positive detec-
tion is a Bernoulli trial with probability p = 0.065. An observed sample
of 2 false positives out of 16 experiments has a statistical signiﬁcance
(or p-value) of 𝛼 = P (Binomial(16,0.065) ≥ 2) = 0.27. Thus with a con-
ﬁdence level of 73%, we can accept the hypothesis that the analytical
model is correct. This conﬁdence interval could be improved with a
larger number of traﬃc traces or longer traces (several days long).
6. Discussion
6.1. Comparison to previous works
As explained in section 4, there are no methods in the literature
directly applicable to the ﬁle sharing scenario. All of them, either
require information not available in the network traﬃc or require
expensive computation in a scenario with several gigabits per second
of traﬃc from a large population.
In order to compare the success and failure results from REDFISH to
previous proposals, we show in Table 7 the most relevant performance
results. We have focused on only a few metrics, as all of them are diﬃ-
cult to compare due to diﬀerences in the scenario. For example, many
ransomware samples become inactive after their command and control
servers are blocked, so the comparison against the same samples is usu-
ally impossible. Also, not all the papers oﬀer clear data about all these
metrics.
The percentage of ransomware samples detected is the most clear
result. It is in a range from 90% to 100%. However, as shown in the
sixth column, the algorithms have been tested with very diﬀerent num-
ber of ransomware families. (Alam et al.,; Continella et al., 2016; Khar-
raz and Kirda, 2017) oﬀer 100% detection rate, but they have tested
with 1, 11 and 29 diﬀerent ransomware families respectively, which
oﬀers very diﬀerent degrees of reliability. REDFISH has been tested
against 19 diﬀerent ransomware families, available since 2014. It has
been designed for 100% detection rate, which it achieves.
The metric of false positives is based on experiments with normal
users. Diﬀerent populations of users and applications are recorded in
each paper, so comparisons are again diﬃcult. In general, the percent-
age of false alarms for the whole population of clean measurements is
oﬀered. In this scenario, REDFISH oﬀers 0 or 1 false positive result in
traces with more than 300 users for a whole work-day. In a trace con-
taining thousands of users in a corporate environment for a whole day
it reported only 2 false alarms. No previous work has validated false
positive results against such large scenarios.
The number of ﬁles lost before ransomware detection varies among
diﬀerent algorithms. The best results are usually oﬀered by those archi-
tectures where the lost ﬁle can be recovered from a backup. REDFISH
is in this category.
Finally, most of the previous works are based on anti-malware soft-
ware installed on the user computer, so they incur in CPU or disk usage.
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Table 7
Comparison to other methods in the literature.
Method % detected % False positives Files lost Overhead Samples/families
N. Scaife et al. (2016) – – 10 10ms 492∕14
A. Kharraz et al. (2015) – – – – 1359∕15
D. Sgandurra et al. 93.3% 1.6% – – 582∕11
F. Mbol et al. (2016) >90% 0.05%–0.25% – – 1∕1
A. Continella et al. (2016) 100% 0.038% Recovered 1.8–3.8× 383∕11
M. Shukla et al. (2016) – – <20 1 − 2% (unknown)
A. Kharraz and Kirda (2017) 100% 0.8% 5 7 − 9% 677∕29
R. Vinayakumar et al. (2017) 98% <1% – – 755∕7
M. Alam et al. 100% ≈0% Recovered – 1∕1
M. M. Ahmadian and Shahriari (2016) 98% Varies – – 8/(unknown)
Y. Feng and Liu (2017) 100% – 0 “low” 1∕1
K. Cabaj and Mazurczyk (2016) – – – – 332∕1
M. M. Ahmadian et al. (2015) 100% 0% 0 – 20∕14
F. Quinkert et al. 96% – 0 – 1∕1
A. Kharraz et al. (2016) 96.3% 0% – – 2121
H. Kim et al. (2017) – – Recovered – –
E. Kolodenker et al. (2017) – – Recovered – 107∕20
T. Lu et al. (2017) 95% 7 − 8% – – 1000/(unknown)
M. M. Hasan and Rahman (2017) 97% 3% – – 360∕20
REDFISH 100% 1 out of 15 days Recovered 0% 54∕19
The metrics vary among papers but on this respect we must highlight
that REDFISH adds no load to these computers, as it runs in an isolated
network appliance.
6.2. Security, performance and ﬁle recovery
REDFISH ransomware detection system does not add any delay to
user traﬃc, as the analysis probe works oﬀ-path, receiving a copy of
the traﬃc. Ransomware detection takes a few seconds and in 99% of
the cases it can detect the ransomware before 10 ﬁles are lost. When
the alarm is triggered the probe can use SDN control mechanisms (e.g.
OpenFlow) to conﬁgure blocking rules for the user traﬃc, denying any
further access to the ﬁler. The alarm can be collected in a Network
Management System (NMS) and trigger the adequate administrative
actions in order to remove the ransomware and allow further access
to the disk array. All the actions related to the detection and blocking
procedures can be taken remotely, accessing the network probe conﬁg-
uration, without any host access.
No software must be installed in any user host. No modiﬁcation is
needed in the ﬁler or the network disk array. Only the analysis probe
must be added to the network, receiving a copy from the traﬃc to the
ﬁler network port and allowing access to the SDN enabled switch in
order to block traﬃc from infected users. Also, no malware that infects
the hosts can uninstall the detection software as it runs in a separate
machine (the analysis probe). This probe is conﬁgured in the manage-
ment network, not accessible from local or remote hosts.
We have evaluated the false positive probability and it is extremely
low after a correct parameter conﬁguration (one in ten million opened
ﬁles). Although we suggest blocking any further access to the ﬁler from
the suspected host, diﬀerent options are possible. If the ﬁler allows priv-
ilege modiﬁcation or it resorts to some kind of external database system
for this purpose, then a read-only mode could be conﬁgured when a user
is suspected to be infected. This is a less intrusive mode for the case
of the extremely rare false positives, while still stopping ransomware
action.
The Private traﬃc trace contains more than 1Tbyte of traﬃc and it
reaches more than 400Mb/s of sustained traﬃc. Our prototype imple-
mentation of the algorithm is capable of analysing the trace in less than
1/32th of its duration, using a single CPU core in an Intel i5-4690 run-
ning at 3.5GHz. This means that more than 10Gb/s of traﬃc can be
processed in near real-time. In contrast to other tools (Continella et
al., 2016; Kharraz and Kirda, 2017; Kharraz et al., 2016; Shukla et al.,
2016; Sgandurra et al.,), it does not analyse the content of the read and
written ﬁles, therefore much higher speeds are achievable. High traﬃc
network scenarios (tens of gigabits per second) can be supported and
even higher traﬃc could be analysed including more CPU cores. No
CPU cycles are taken from any user host, compared to locally installed
antivirus software.
Common network traﬃc analysis software and hardware like
HPCAP (Moreno et al., 2014), FlowScope (Emmerich et al., 2017),
DPDK (Intel) and EndaceProbe (Introducing EndaceProbe) can store the
traﬃc in hard disk while sustaining the analysis of 10Gb/s links. They
usually take a circular buﬀer approach and delete the stored traﬃc after
a certain period or when the available disk space is low. Using RED-
FISH, when ransomware is detected the traﬃc traces for that user could
be marked for not deletion. Afterwards, a network administrator could
recover the lost ﬁles from the stored traﬃc. This is possible because the
ransomware must read the ﬁle before creating the encrypted version.
Once the infected host is located, the lost ﬁles can be recovered from
the SMB READ commands. This is what a plugin for Wireshark already
does (Deck, 2015). Therefore, even if some ﬁles were lost before the
ransomware was detected they can be recovered from the traﬃc stored
at the network probe. The recovered ﬁles are not out-of-date backups
but the exact ﬁle version that the ransomware encrypted and removed.
Therefore, 0 lost ﬁles can be achieved.
6.3. Robustness analysis
The design of REDFISH is based on intrinsic characteristics to any
ransomware. It is based on their reading and writing activity, as well
as the act of deleting ﬁles or overwriting content. Ransomware can-
not accomplish its goal without any of these three actions. However, it
could try to appear as a benign application, reducing its activity below
the thresholds that distinguish benign from malign software actions.
We provide in this section a critic analysis of any strategy that we
could imagine where a ransomware, having perfect knowledge about
the algorithm, could avoid detection.
REDFISH establishes a threshold on the read&write activity. RED-
FISH1 quickly recognises ransomware that overwrites the original ﬁle
or creates the encrypted version in the same ﬁlesystem path. REDFISH2
is insensitive to changes in ﬁle path while it is kept in the same ﬁler.
However, if ransomware keeps its activity below Vthres it would remain
undetected. The problem in this ransomware strategy is that the recom-
mended value for Vthres is very small, around 100 kb/s. If the malware
keeps its activity below this threshold then it cannot destroy so much
data before a new periodic backup takes place. For example, if nightly
backups are implemented then the maximum amount of ﬁle data that
the ransomware could read, encrypt and destroy would be around
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1GByte (24 h of activity at 100 kb/s). It must also be smart enough
to destroy recently modiﬁed ﬁles ﬁrst, or else it could be destroying
ﬁles that have not been modiﬁed since the previous backup. This strat-
egy also oﬀers the users more time to notice the ransomware, simply by
human detection of encrypted ﬁles. This weakness exists but the strat-
egy to use it reduces greatly the impact the ransomware could have.
The ransomware could overwrite only a fraction of the whole ﬁle.
There are already samples that follow this behaviour, although all of
them are currently detected by REDFISH. For some ﬁle formats it is
enough with a small modiﬁcation in the ﬁle to render it unusable. If the
amount of bytes overwritten was small, the ransomware could destroy
many ﬁles while keeping its read&write footprint below the thresh-
old. REDFISH2 can reduce its second threshold V∗thres to 0, increasing
only slightly the number of false positives but forcing this type of ran-
somware to keep not only their disk access speed below the threshold
but also the number of ﬁles they delete. However, using T∗ = 20 s and
N∗ = 50 the ransomware could remove almost 150 ﬁles per minute
and stay undetected if it modiﬁes only a few bytes from each ﬁle. The
eﬀectiveness of this strategy depends on whether the ﬁles are really
rendered unrecoverable by small modiﬁcations, which would depend
on the ﬁle types in the shared volume. For example, it would be easy to
recover any data not overwritten from a plain text ﬁle, therefore, again
the eﬀectiveness in this strategy is low.
If the user computer has access to more than one shared volume,
from diﬀerent ﬁlers, ﬁle operations to one volume and to another would
be carried in diﬀerent TCP connections transporting SMB commands.
REDFISH, as it has been described, analyses each TCP connection inde-
pendently. The ransomware could read and delete ﬁles from one vol-
ume while writing the encrypted versions to a diﬀerent volume, try-
ing to void increasing the read&write speed as it is measured. This
would certainly work but the scenario where it could be applied is
quite restrictive (several ﬁlers) and REDFISH could be easily extended
in order to consider any SMB session from the same IP address (which
identiﬁes the user).
Finally, the ransomware could read and delete ﬁles from the net-
work shared volume while keeping the encrypted versions local to the
infected host. This behaviour could still be detected by REDFISH2 by
using V∗thres = 0. Writing in the same volume as the original ﬁle is a
safer strategy for the ransomware, as the encrypted ﬁles occupy mostly
the same as the original ﬁles, so they ﬁt in the volume. However, mov-
ing them to a diﬀerent disk (which also happens in the previous attack
proposed) has the risk of ﬁlling the destination disk, therefore not being
able to continue operation.
Although we cannot prove that the strategy described in REDFISH
will work for any possible ransomware behaviour, we are conﬁdent that
any devised strategy to avoid detection will come at a cost of reduced
ransomware eﬀectiveness, therefore the implementation of REDFISH
provides a clear advantage. The capability of ﬁle recovery from the
stored network traﬃc, alone, already provides beneﬁts from the deploy-
ment of the analysis probe.
7. Conclusions
We have described and analysed REDFISH, a detection algorithm for
strains of ransomware that encrypt ﬁles in network shared volumes. The
algorithm works with a copy of the traﬃc, without any eﬀect on normal
user activity. It detects the ransomware based on its basic behaviour of
reading, writing and removing ﬁles.
We have shown how the algorithm parameters can be tuned in order
to obtain 100% ransomware detection with 19 diﬀerent ransomware
families. We have shown by experimentation and analytical modeling
that in more than 99% of the cases the ransomware is detected before
10 ﬁles are deleted. These ﬁles can be recovered from the traﬃc that
the network probe is storing, therefore a no-losses scenario is achieved.
False positives (triggering the alarm without real ransomware
action) are extremely rare: only one false alarm for 10 million ﬁles
opened, read and written in a real business scenario with more than
4800 users working for a whole day and accessing more than 1500
network shared volumes. The results are consistent with the analytical
model provided for the false positive rate.
The algorithm can be implemented in 10Gb/s network traﬃc
probes, using a low number of CPU cores, without any impact on host
CPUs because no software is installed in them. The whole detection sys-
tem is out of the production network and it cannot be attacked by any
form of malware that could deactivate it.
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